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 THE “SECOND LABOUR 
TRILOGY”:  
A COMMENT ON R. V. ADVANCE 
CUTTING, DUNMORE V. 
ONTARIO, AND R.W.D.S.U. V. 
PEPSI-COLA 
B. Jamie Cameron* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
2002 is a year of reckoning for the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1 The 
first 20 years of decision making have registered victories in the name of con-
stitutional rights, and missed opportunities too. Much of the attention on this 
anniversary will place the jurisprudence under scrutiny, in an attempt to under-
stand why the Supreme Court of Canada enforced the guarantees in certain 
instances and deferred to the democratic process in others.  
At present, the pattern is one of astute decision making that is case-specific, 
and prefers to resolve issues on narrow grounds. In this, the Court negotiates a 
course between confrontation with legislatures and the public and its duty to 
enforce the Charter. Examples of trade-offs between the judiciary’s responsibil-
ity to enforce the Charter and its perception of institutional vulnerability in-
clude  
Little Sisters Books & Art Emporium v. Canada,2 R. v. Sharpe,3 and Suresh v. 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).4  
                                                                                                                                                              
* Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. Her primary teaching and research in-
terests over the years have been constitutional and Charter law, American constitutional law, 
criminal law and freedom of expression. 
1
  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11. 
2
  [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (concluding that Customs Canada had discriminated against Little 
Sisters and infringed its rights under s. 2(b), and refusing a remedy in the circumstances). See J. 
Benedet, “Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Minister of Justice: Sex Equality and the Attack 
on Butler” (2001), 390 H.L.J. 197; and B. Ryder, “The Little Sisters Case, Administrative Censor-
ship and Obscenity Law” (2001), 39 O.H.L.J. 207; see generally, J. Cameron, “Anticipation: 
Expressive Freedom and the Supreme Court of Canada in the New Millennium” (2001), S. Ct. L. 
Rev. 67. 
3
  [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (accommodating expressive freedom through an elaborate exercise in 
statutory interpretation while avoiding the furor which would have ensued had the Criminal Code’s 
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In this workmanlike approach to the Charter, much is predictable, and what 
is not is institutionally safe. It is difficult to imagine this a bold Court, or one 
that aspires to a vision of constitutional rights. Yet if that is the impression, 
counterexamples can still be found. For instance, the rise of the worker was 
easily the most notable development in the latter part of 2001 and early 2002. 
Against a backdrop of long-standing deference to legislative and administrative 
decision makers, the Court supported trade unions three times in succession. 
First, R. v. Advance Cutting and Coring Ltd. chose collective interests over 
individual rights to uphold a legislative scheme which imposed serious con-
straints on section 2(d)’s negative and positive entitlements.5 Then, Dunmore v. 
Ontario (Attorney General) all but abandoned precedent to hold a legislature 
accountable for not protecting the meaningful exercise of associational free-
dom.6 Finally, in R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages 
(West), the Court unanimously placed itself on the side of workers in a decision 
that set up common law limits on secondary picketing against the expressive 
freedom of picketers.7 
Previously, workers had been perennial losers under the Charter. In that re-
gard, though Dolphin Delivery Ltd. acknowledged in dicta that section 2(b) 
protects labour picketing,8 the pattern was set in 1987, when a majority of the 
Supreme Court gave section 2(d) what can only be described as a deadening 
interpretation. In concluding that associational freedom is an individual right 
and does not protect collective bargaining or the right to strike, the Labour 
Trilogy relegated the guarantee to irrelevance.9 This year, however, unions and 
                                                                                                                                                              
child pornography legislation been in part or in whole struck down). See Cameron, id. (commenting 
on this aspect of Sharpe). 
4
  2002 SCC 1 (holding that it is unconstitutional to deport a refugee who faces a substantial 
risk of torture on refoulement and allowing, at the same time, that there may be exceptions to that 
rule).  
5
  2001 SCC 70 (upholding provisions which compelled construction workers to join one of 
five unions designated by the statute). 
6
  2001 SCC 94 (imposing a constitutional duty on the government to protect the s. 2(d) 
rights of agricultural workers). 
7
  2002 SCC 8 (modifying the common law rule that secondary labour picketing is per se il-
legal). 
8
  R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (concluding that the Charter did 
not apply and that secondary picketing could justifiably be limited); see also BCGEU v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 (upholding an injunction prohibiting union 
picketing of courthouses); but see Lavigne v. O.P.S.E.U., [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (upholding the 
union’s right to compel union dues from non-members for non-collective bargaining purposes); and 
U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. KMart Canada Ltd., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083 [hereinafter “KMart”] (uphold-
ing a union’s right to engage in “leafleting” at a secondary site).  
9
  The Labour Trilogy comprises Re Public Service Employee Relations Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 
313 [hereinafter the “Alberta Reference”]; P.S.A.C. v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; and 
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their causes emerged victorious in the decisions above which are referred to in 
this article as the “second labour trilogy”. Exploring how and why the rights of 
workers caught the Court’s attention is the subject of this article. At the outset, 
it can be noted that, under existing authority, each of these decisions could have 
been decided differently. From that perspective, it becomes especially impor-
tant to understand the significance of this trilogy. 
Advance Cutting, Dunmore, and Pepsi-Cola may also have implications that 
extend beyond the constitutionalization of labour relations. After analyzing 
each in sequence, a concluding section considers their implications for other 
Charter issues. In doing so, it asks whether the second trilogy should be under-
stood as a result-oriented expression of judicial sympathy for workers or seen, 
instead, as decisions that rest on principles of Charter interpretation.  
In either case, the trilogy demonstrates the McLachlin Court’s willingness to 
challenge the assumptions of the Charter’s early landmarks. Finally, the article 
closes by inviting the Court to re-think other assumptions of Charter interpreta-
tion and, in particular, the  
relationship between section 15’s equality guarantee and its limits under section 
1. 
1.  Freedom of Association 
In effect, the Labour Trilogy limited freedom of association to the formal 
right of individuals to establish, belong to, and maintain associations. Activities 
undertaken in association, by way of collective endeavour, had no status under 
section 2(d), unless the self same activity would be independently protected by 
the Charter if undertaken by an individual.10 Significantly, a majority of the 
judges on the Trilogy panel rejected a conception of the guarantee as collective 
in nature; to avoid the risk that associations might thereby be granted special 
                                                                                                                                                              
R.W.D.S.U. v. Sask., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460. See also Professional Institute of the Public Service of 
Canada v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367 (rejecting an association’s 
claim that it was entitled to be recognized for collective bargaining purposes); Canadian Egg 
Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157 [hereinafter “CEMA”] (rejecting a claim that 
excluding egg producers from a marketing scheme violated s. 2(d); and Delisle v. Canada (Deputy 
Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 [hereinafter “Delisle”] (rejecting the claim that excluding 
the RCMP from the federal government’s statutory labour regime violated s. 2(d)). 
10
  It is difficult to draw doctrine from the fragmented opinions by the Court’s panel of six in 
the Alberta Reference, the leading decision in the Labour Trilogy. At most, LeDain J., for the 
majority result, and McIntyre J., concurring, agreed that s. 2(d) protects the bare right to form an 
association, as well as associational activities that are protected by other Charter guarantees, such as 
s. 2(b). While McIntyre J. would also have included associational activities which would be lawful 
if undertaken by an individual, Dickson C.J. and Wilson J. dissented on the basis that a guarantee of 
associational freedom must include a collective element. 
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status under the Charter, they concluded that freedom of association should be 
regarded as an individual right.11 In Professional Institute v. Northwest Territo-
ries, the late Sopinka J. synthesized the Trilogy’s conception of associational 
freedom in a four-point test.12 A valiant attempt to propose concrete doctrine 
nonetheless floundered when the framework failed to attract majority support.13 
As a result, labour union claims and freedom of association more generally lay 
dormant for the most part until the late 1990s, as there was little point litigating 
section 2(d) issues that could not succeed.14 As the millennium approached, the 
Supreme Court issued decisions in two freedom of association cases but re-
jected the claim both times; in doing so it impliedly endorsed Professional 
Institute’s four-point test, albeit without expressly adopting it.15  
As LeBel J. acknowledged in Advance Cutting, deference was the organizing 
principle of the section 2(d) labour relations jurisprudence. There, he indicated 
that the Court’s reluctance to accept that “the whole field of labour relations” 
should fall under the Charter was well established.16 After describing the judici-
ary’s “non-intervention policy” in some detail, he declared that labour relations 
had deliberately been left “entirely to the political process, Parliament and 
provincial legislatures”.17 His reasons in Advance Cutting confirm that LeBel J. 
supported this “hands-off policy” for removing “any Charter protection from 
the bargaining procedures and rights that have largely defined the role of un-
                                                                                                                                                              
11
  As McIntyre J. explained in the Alberta Reference, supra, note 10, at 404, “[i]f Charter 
protection is given to an association for its lawful acts and objects, then the Charter-protected rights 
of the association would exceed those of the individual merely by virtue of the fact of association.” 
12
  The four-point framework declared: “... first, that s. 2(d) protects the freedom to establish, 
belong to and maintain an association; second, that s. 2(d) does not protect an activity solely on the 
ground that the activity is a foundational or essential purpose of an association; third, that s. 2(d) 
protects the exercise in association of the constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals; and 
fourth, that s. 2(d) protects the exercise in association of the constitutional rights and freedoms of 
individuals. Professional Institute, supra, note 9, at 402. 
13
  Three of the panel’s seven members dissented from Sopinka J.’s majority disposition, and 
three others wrote separately to support the result, without endorsing its reasoning. 
14
  See Black v. Law Society of Alberta, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591 (invalidating restrictions on the 
freedom to form interprovincial law partnerships under s. 6 rather than s. 2(d)); and R. v. Skinner, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1235 (concluding that Criminal Code provisions prohibiting the public solicitation 
of prostitution do not offend s. 2(d)); but see Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
569 (concluding, without discussing s. 2(d) as an independent guarantee, that Quebec’s statutory 
referendum framework violated s. 2(b) and (d)). 
15
  CEMA, supra, note 9, at 232; and Delisle, id., at 1007 (stating that CEMA had cited the 
Professional Institute test “with approval”). 
16
  Advance Cutting, supra, note 5, at para. 156. 
17
  Id., at para. 161 (emphasis added). 
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ions”.18 Testing his assertion that the Charter has remained “a neutral force” is a 
key objective of the discussion which follows.19 
II.  ADVANCE CUTTING AND CORING LTD. V. QUEBEC 
Advance Cutting in some ways reprised the issues decided in Lavigne v. 
O.P.S.E.U.20 There, an individual complained that mandatory dues check-off 
violated his negative entitlement under section 2(d) to be free from compelled 
association with his workplace labour union. In fact, Mr. Lavigne was not a 
member of and was not required to join the union; nor did he resist the obliga-
tion to pay Rand formula dues. Rather, he objected to that portion of mandatory 
dues which was deflected from collective bargaining purposes to support an 
assortment of non-workplace causes. In this, he complained that he was com-
pelled to support and be affiliated with objectionable purposes, contrary to the 
Charter. 
The scheme challenged in Advance Cutting was quite different. There, legis-
lation sought to regulate Quebec’s construction industry as comprehensively as 
possible. In terms of section 2(d)’s negative entitlement, provincial legislation 
compelled workers, as a condition of employment, to obtain a competency 
certificate and to choose membership in one of five government-recognized 
employee associations.21 By requiring workers to become union members, as a 
matter of law, the regime violated the Rand formula’s compromise between the 
closed shop and the free rider. As Bastarache J. explained, in dissent, the for-
mula balanced the interests of individuals in “not being forced to associate with 
an organization against their will with the interest of the majority in preventing 
a minority from acquiring the fruits of collective bargaining without having to 
pay for it”.22 This landmark in Canadian labour relations entitled the unions to 
dues check-off, and allowed workers the choice of belonging to the organiza-
tion or not. Under Quebec’s scheme, however, construction workers were 
                                                                                                                                                              
18
  Id., at para. 162 (emphasis added). 
19
  Id., stating that the Charter has remained “a neutral force” on questions related to labour 
relations. 
20
  Supra, note 8. 
21
  The appellants were charged under s. 119.1 of an Act Respecting Labour Relations, Voca-
tional Training and Manpower Management in the Construction Industry, R.S.Q., c. R-20, which 
prohibited employers from hiring workers, and workers from performing work in the industry, 
without a competency certificate as required by the statute. Section 28 provided that workers could 
not obtain a competency certificate without joining one of the five union groups designated by the 
legislation.  
22
  Advance Cutting, supra, note 5, at para. 4 (quoting Trade Union Law in Canada) (empha-
sis in original). 
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required to support the costs of collective bargaining and to become members 
of the union. Moreover, by setting conditions on access to employment, the 
statute also affected the freedom to associate.23 In comparison to Lavigne, 
Advance Cutting’s consequences for associational freedom were drastic. 
Returning briefly to Lavigne, all seven members of the panel rejected the in-
dividual’s claim to be free from compelled financial association with the un-
ion’s broader causes. While four judges found no breach of section 2(d), three 
found an infringement that was justifiable under section 1.24 Ironically, though 
the Labour Trilogy defined freedom of association as an individual right, Mr. 
Lavigne lost because the union’s collective interest in pursuing causes outside 
the workplace was paramount. Consequently, Lavigne counted as a victory for 
labour, but confirmed the near impossibility of establishing a breach under 
section 2(d). From that perspective, it is difficult to agree with LeBel J. who, in 
Advance Cutting, denied that freedom of association is an “inferior right, barely 
tolerated and narrowly circumscribed”.25 Under the jurisprudence prior to the 
second trilogy, an individualist conception of the guarantee spurned collective 
activities when the “positive” right was in issue, only to rally around collective 
endeavour, at the expense of an individual’s freedom from compulsion, when 
the “negative” entitlement was at stake. 
In testing the legislation regulating of Quebec’s construction industry against 
the Rand formula, Advance Cutting exposed deep rifts among members of the 
Court. Four judges found no breach of the Charter, and four others were ada-
mant that Quebec’s compulsory membership scheme fundamentally compro-
mised the guarantee of associational freedom. In the event, Iacobucci J. 
provided the decisive vote which found a breach which was saved under sec-
tion 1.26  
                                                                                                                                                              
23
  Under the legislation, workers were not eligible to work in the construction industry unless 
they had lived in Quebec the previous year, had worked at least 300 hours, and were under the age 
of 50. Regional quotas also limited the number of workers in each predetermined region in the 
province. 
24
  Justice La Forest with Sopinka and Gonthier JJ., concurring, upheld the limit under s. 1; 
Wilson J., with L’Heureux-Dubé and Cory JJ., concurring, found no breach of s. 2(d)); and 
McLachlin J. likewise found no breach, albeit for different reasons; Lavigne, supra, note 8. 
25
  Advance Cutting, supra, note 5, at para. 208. 
26
  Oral argument was heard in March 2000, but the Court’s decision was not released until 
October 2001, some 20 months later. Justice LeBel, with Gonthier and Arbour JJ., concurring, 
found no breach of s. 2(d); L’Heureux-Dubé J. wrote separate reasons concurring in that conclu-
sion; Bastarache J., with McLachlin C.J.C. and Major and Binnie JJ. concurring, found a breach 
that could not be saved by s. 1; in a brief opinion that recalled Sopinka J.’s pivotal role in Egan v. 
Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, Iacobucci J. agreed with the four judges who found a breach, and 
then supported the result advocated by the other four who upheld the legislation. 
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One element in the question whether section 2(d) should be seen as an indi-
vidual or a collective entitlement is the symmetry, or lack thereof, between the 
guarantee’s positive and negative entitlements. In logic, if the Charter prohibits 
the state from interfering with the exercise of fundamental freedoms, it must 
also prohibit the state from compelling individuals to exercise a fundamental 
freedom against their will. The Court’s conclusion in R.J.R.-MacDonald v. 
Canada (Attorney General), that the government’s mandatory labeling provi-
sion failed the minimal impairment test, essentially recognized that principle.27 
The same principle found voice, earlier, in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.’s power-
ful statement that freedom is characterized by the absence of coercion or con-
straint, and that a person who is compelled by the state to a course of action or 
inaction which would not otherwise have been chosen is not truly free.28 Even 
so, the asymmetry of this jurisprudence is that the Court remains hesitant to 
enforce claims based on an individual’s freedom from compulson.29 
With Gonthier and Arbour JJ. concurring, LeBel J. wrote for three of the 
four judges who found no breach of section 2(d) in Advance Cutting. In doing 
so, he rejected the suggestion that the guarantee’s negative entitlement should 
be seen as a “simple mirror-image of the positive right of association”.30 He 
regarded it as necessary, in the interests of democracy, to place “some inner 
limits and restrictions” on section 2(d)’s potential for freedom from associa-
tion.31 Thus he adopted LaForest J.’s rationale in Lavigne, that “forced associa-
tions which flow from the functioning of democracy cannot be severed” 
through the Charter’s intervention.32 Put differently, association can be com-
pelled if it serves such purposes, as “[d]emocracy is not primarily about with-
drawal, but fundamentally about participation in the life and management of 
democratic institutions like unions”.33 Allowing individuals to withdraw would 
compromise their “group voice” and deny them “the benefits arising from an 
association”.34 Meanwhile, L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s sole concurrence advocated 
the more radical position that section 2(d) does not include a negative entitle-
ment.35 
                                                                                                                                                              
27
  [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199. 
28
   [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 336-37. 
29
  In addition to Lavigne, supra, note 8, see Slaight Communications v. Davidson, [1989] 1 
S.C.R. 1038 (upholding a human rights tribunal decision, challenged under s. 2(b), which com-
pelled an employer to write a designated letter of reference for a wrongfully dismissed employee). 
30
  Advance Cutting, supra, note 5, at para. 206. 
31
  Id., at para. 208. 
32
  Id., at para. 207. 
33
  Id. 
34
  Id., at para. 208. 
35
  See, e.g., id., at para. 58 (stating that it is “antithetical to the purpose and scope” of s. 2(d) 
to protect a negative entitlement); para. 67 (declaring that if the purpose of associational freedom “ 
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To answer what could not be disputed, that construction workers required by 
law to join one of five designated unions were placed under an involuntary 
regime of compelled association, LeBel J. insisted that the obligation had no 
more than a “limited impact” on the “asserted” right not to associate.36 He was 
led to this conclusion by his conception of ideological conformity, which he 
adopted as the standard of breach for the negative entitlement. In this the judge 
relied on McLachlin J.’s concurrence in Lavigne and her finding, there, that 
ideological coercion was not inherent in the payment of mandatory dues.37 
Analogizing from dues to compelled membership, he declared that involuntary 
association is “neutral”, absent evidence of ideological conformity.38  
Further, LeBel J. observed that, in contrast to Lavigne, where the appellant 
had specified the causes to which he objected, “no witness came forward to 
assert that he felt or believed that joining a union associated him with activities 
he disapproved of”.39 Likewise, there was no evidence of union practices that 
imposed values or opinions, no evidence about the internal life of construction 
unions, and no indication that the union limited free expression in a way that 
might trigger section 2(d)’s negative entitlement.40 In LeBel J.’s view, the 
statute imposed little more than a “bare obligation to belong”, and did not 
create any mechanism to enforce ideological conformity.41  
He conceded that it is well known and well documented that unions inter-
vene in political and social debate. Still, he was far from persuaded that Quebec 
unions have “a constant ideology”, act “in constant support of a particular cause 
                                                                                                                                                              
‘is to permit the collective pursuit of common goals’, then the very concept of a ‘negative freedom 
of association’ becomes suspect.”); para. 75 (claiming that “judicial parsimony” is appropriate, in 
defining the scope of s. 2(d), because constitutional remedies are “powerful tools which ought to be 
used with prudence”); and para. 76 (describing the negative entitlement as having a “tainted pedi-
gree” aimed at the right not to associate). 
36
  Id., at para. 278; see also para. 277 (stating that “[t]his limited form of compelled associa-
tion respects fundamental democratic values” and that it requires “only a limited commitment from 
construction employees”); and para. 218 (describing the obligation to join a union as a “very 
limited one”). 
37
  In Lavigne v. O.P.S.E.U., [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211, McLachlin J. found no breach of s. 2(d) on 
the facts, because in her view the payment of union dues under the Rand formula could not reason-
ably be seen as compelling Lavigne into ideological conformity with the union’s causes. Meantime, 
while also recognizing ideological conformity as a factor, La Forest J. in Lavigne supported a 
broader conception of the negative right and found, specifically, that the compelled association 
violated s. 2(d) because it extended to areas outside the areas of common interest to which the Rand 
formula’s rationale applied. 
38
  Advance Cutting, 2001 SCC 70, at para. 201. 
39
  Id., at para. 220. 
40
  Id., at para. 223. 
41
  Id., at para. 218. 
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or policy”, or seek to “impose that ideology on their members”.42 Any such 
assumption, in his view, would indulge impermissible stereotypes of the union 
movement as “authoritarian and undemocratic”.43 As far as LeBel J. was con-
cerned, the appellants had based their case on a misguided notion of “some 
absolute right” which, absent concrete evidence of imposed conformity, “may 
not rest on a generalized suspicion of the nature of unions and their manage-
ment of internal life”.44  
In discounting the infringement this way, LeBel J.’s reasons are strikingly 
formalistic. Though others could be added, two examples from equality juris-
prudence illustrate the flaw in that approach. First, against the proposition that 
racially segregated schools do not discriminate against black children without 
proof of inequality on a school-by-school or student-by-student basis, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held in Brown v. Board of Education that separate is not 
equal.45 Counting and comparing how many pencils, blackboards and play-
grounds black and white children had was not the issue: segregation was a 
question of principle. Second, and by the same token, the affirmative action 
programs are not restricted to those who can prove that they themselves have 
directly suffered discrimination.46 If the above parallels are not perfect, they are 
close enough to show that LeBel J.’s reasons rested on a formalistic conception 
of compelled association. 
Meanwhile, Mr. Justice Bastarache’s passionate dissent drew concurrences 
from McLachlin C.J., as well as from Major and Binnie JJ. Though he dis-
agreed with LeBel J.’s interpretation of ideological conformity, the meaning of 
democracy and its implications for forced association marked the true point of 
difference between the two. Without settling the content of associational free-
dom, Bastarache J. accepted, for purposes of Advance Cutting, that ideological 
conformity encompassed all aspects of the case. Therefore, whether or not 
forced association might be considered prima facie in breach of section 2(d), he 
                                                                                                                                                              
42
  Id., at para. 227. 
43
  Id. 
44
  Id., at para. 232. 
45
  U.S. 347 (1954) 483. 
46
  Race or gender-conscious remedies are not particularly controversial when the individual 
benefitted is a direct victim of discrimination; accordingly, affirmative action programs must rest 
on the broader rationale that members of the group are eligible as beneficiaries, regardless whether 
they have suffered discrimination. 
 It is also useful to remember that a formalistic approach is not foreign to labour relations; 
in the early 20th century, during the infamous Lochner era, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated 
statutory provisions aimed at equalizing the relationship between employees and their employers, 
on the ground that state interference offended the “equality of right” that each side in the employ-
ment relationship enjoyed. The fiction there was that the worker and his boss were formal, legal 
equals. 
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concluded, at the least, that the government must justify coerced association in 
circumstances where ideological conformity is imposed.47  
On the merits, Bastarache J. found that ideological conformity is unavoid-
able in a scheme of compelled union membership. That conclusion followed his 
characterization of the union movement as “a participant in the political and 
social debate at the core of Canadian democracy”.48 Additionally and by way of 
prelude to his reasons in Dunmore, he remarked that “[t]he collective character 
of the right to associate is undeniable because collective activity is not equiva-
lent to the addition of individual activities”.49 That collective endeavour may be 
an important and distinctive function of an association did not mean, however, 
that membership can be compelled by the state. Recognizing that the collective 
force of union membership can be politically and socially potent, Bastarache J. 
held that it must be “constituted democratically” to conform to section 2(d).50 
More “independent evidence” of the ideological views of specific unions 
was unnecessary because unions designated by statute and granted a sinecure of 
coerced membership are fundamentally undemocractic. Whereas Lavigne did 
not compromise the democratic principle, Quebec’s legislation required adher-
ence to a “scheme advocating state-imposed compulsory membership”.51 Jus-
tice Bastarache went on to state that “[i]deological constraint exists in particular 
where membership numbers are used to promote ideological agendas”, and 
added that “this is so even where there is no evidence that the union is coercing 
its members to believe in what it promotes”; in such circumstances, adherence 
is “itself a form of ideological coercion”.52 Describing the regime as a “system 
of forced association and state control over work opportunity”, he concluded 
that “the democratic rights of workers” had been taken away.53 Emphatically, 
he declared that “[b]eing forced to accept and participate in a system that se-
verely limits the democratic principle in the area of labour relations is a form of 
coercion that cannot be segregated totally from ideological conformity”.54  
The contrast was stark between Bastarache J., who regarded the scheme as a 
serious infringement of section 2(d)’s negative and positive entitlements, and 
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  Advance Cutting, supra, note 5, at para. 19. 
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  Id., at para. 17. 
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  Id. 
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  Id., at para. 27. 
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  Id., at para. 28 (emphasis added). 
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  Id., at para. 34. 
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LeBel J., who regarded it as a limited interference with a negative entitlement 
which should be checked by internal limitations. Divergent interpretations of 
the right in turn prompted different views of the Charter’s evidentiary require-
ments. As far as LeBel J. was concerned, the appellants could not establish a 
breach without exposing the particulars of ideological conformity. Meanwhile, 
after characterizing compulsory unionization as ideological in nature, Basta-
rache J., quickly dismissed the government’s section 1 argument.55 That left 
Iacobucci J. admitting that he found himself in an “unusual situation”.56 Though 
he found, under section 2(d), that the legislation failed to provide “any justifica-
tion” for compelled union association,57 he concluded that the scheme was 
saved under section 1 by its “unique and complex historical context”.58 
In some respects, Advance Cutting signalled the second “trilogy” decision in 
Dunmore v. Ontario.59 Though the positive entitlement was not at issue, Ad-
vance Cutting hinted that the Court might be prepared to reconsider the as-
sumption that section 2(d) is an individual, rather than a collective, 
entitlement.60 It is remarkable, as well, that a majority upheld a regime that 
derogated from the Rand formula, which has for years been a mainstay of 
Canadian labour law. Not only that, the infringement was much more severe in 
Advance Cutting than in Lavigne, because “being forced by the government to 
join one of five specified unions differs drastically from being forced to pay 
union dues”.61 
At the same time, elements of Advance Cutting would prove inconsistent 
with the Court’s decision in Dunmore. Just as LeBel J. emphasized the princi-
ple of deference in labour relations, Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s concur-
ring opinion repeatedly spoke of the need for judicial restraint, judicial 
parsimony, caution and prudence.62 Yet all members of the Court who deferred 
to the legislature in Advance Cutting joined Bastarache J.’s opinion in Dun-
more, which was anything but deferential. 
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  Id., at paras. 43-51 (explaining that even if the statute’s stated objectives were accepted, its 
provisions would fail the rational connection and minimal impairment tests). 
56
  Id., at para. 281.  
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  Id., at para. 287. 
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  2001 SCC 94. 
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  See supra, note 49 (per Bastarache J.). Meantime, while LeBel J. emphasized the individ-
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Finally, there is the question of evidence as a factor in Advance Cutting. 
Though LeBel J. maintained that the section 2(d) claim must fail because ideo-
logical conformity had not been proved, that standard would shift before long. 
In Dunmore, it was difficult to show that the agricultural workers’ inability to 
organize was somehow the government’s responsibility. Along with 
L’Heureux-Dubé J., the judges who joined LeBel J. in Advance Cutting also 
agreed in Dunmore that, despite the presence of systemic, causal factors in the 
industry, the government was accountable under the Charter for not intervening 
to secure the section 2(d) rights of agricultural workers. 
Whether Advance Cutting will undermine the Rand formula in other contexts 
remains to be seen. Though LeBel J. stressed that compelled membership is a 
limited obligation and therefore not a serious infringement of section 2(d), the 
troubled history of Quebec’s construction industry provides a basis for distinc-
tion in future cases. Even so, Advance Cutting can only be viewed as a signifi-
cant victory for labour unions and the primacy of collective interests over 
individual freedom. For that reason, it provided the anchor in the Supreme 
Court’s “second labour trilogy”. 
III.  DUNMORE V. ONTARIO (ATTORNEY GENERAL) 
Dunmore v. Ontario63 challenged legislation which excluded agricultural 
workers from a provincial labour relations scheme. The workers, who had been 
excluded from the regime for some 50 years, had never been able to organize. 
During one short year, they enjoyed fleeting status under the Agricultural La-
bour Relations Act (the “ALRA”), which was then repealed following a change 
in government.64 The appellants claimed that by reverting to the pre-ALRA 
scheme, Ontario had infringed their freedom of association under section 2(d), 
and violated section 15(1)’s guarantee of equality. 
Prior to Dunmore, the Supreme Court had consistently held that section 2(d) 
imposes no obligation on government either to engage in collective bargaining 
or to recognize and include particular unions in its management of labour rela-
tions.65 More modestly, the guarantee was aimed at statutes which imposed a 
direct prohibition on the right to form an association or which otherwise placed 
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  Supra, note 59. Justice Bastarache wrote the majority opinion, in which L’Heureux-Dubé 
J. separately concurred; Major J. dissented alone. 
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  S.O. 1994, c. 6. Section 80 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, (“LRESLAA”) S.O. 1995, 
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Labour Relations Act 1948 (“LRA”), S.O. 1948, c. 51, which excluded them from the LRA’s 
labour relation’s regime. Section 80 also terminated any certification rights of trade unions, and any 
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certain restrictions on collective activity.66 Against governing authority, the 
appellants argued that, in the absence of status under the LRA, it was impossi-
ble for agricultural workers to organize. At trial, Sharpe J., as he then was, 
found “nothing in Ontario’s statutory labour law regime that prohibits or even 
actively discourages agricultural workers from forming trade unions”.67 Inas-
much as their efforts to organize might be resisted or undermined by private 
employers or the common law, he concluded that their complaint was about 
private power, not state action. Effectively, the appellants were attempting to 
“impose upon the province a positive duty to enhance the right of freedom of 
association” through a legislative scheme “conducive to the enjoyment of” their 
rights under section 2(d).68 Justice Sharpe’s conclusion that both claims must 
fail was upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal, before being reversed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada.69 
To assume that the outcome in Dunmore was driven by its particular facts 
obscures the significance of a decision which shifted section 2(d) in a new 
direction and effectively collapsed the distinction between the public and the 
private.70 Moreover, the Court could only impose a positive obligation on the 
province through an attenuated conception of causation that linked legislative 
inaction to the inability of private sector employees to organize. In the end, the 
Court held that Ontario was obliged to ensure that its agricultural workers could 
exercise their right of associational freedom vis-a-vis private employers in a 
meaningful way. 
That conclusion was impeded by virtually all the section 2(d) jurisprudence, 
including the Court’s immediately preceding decision in Delisle v. Canada.71 
There, Bastarache J. held that the Charter did not require the federal govern-
ment to include RCMP employees in its statutory labour relations regime. As 
he explained, “[i]t is because of the very nature of freedom that section 2 gen-
erally imposes a negative obligation on the government and not a positive 
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  Id., at 300 (emphasis added). 
69
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obligation of protection or assistance”.72 To that he added, “[i]t is accordingly 
settled that the exclusion of a group of workers from a specific statutory 
scheme” does not preclude the establishment of parallel, independent associa-
tions, and that there is no violation of section 2(d) “because one group of work-
ers is included in the regime which another is not”.73 In Delisle Bastarache J. 
was firmly of the view that “it must be open to the government to determine 
which association or forms of expression are entitled to special support or 
protection”.74 
On its face Dunmore appeared to raise an indistinguishable issue; but not so, 
said the judge who wrote the majority opinion in both cases. To avoid Delisle’s 
force as precedent, Bastarache J. identified two key differences between the 
RCMP and Ontario’s agricultural workers. First, he pointed out that while the 
RCMP’s employer is the government, agricultural workers are part of the pri-
vate sector. Ordinarily, that difference would give the RCMP a stronger claim, 
as government is bound by the Charter and private employers are not. Yet he 
turned the tables by claiming that Delisle was limited, as precedent, to the 
circumstances of a public employer. It is arguable, he explained, that Delisle 
“was not intended to apply where private employers are involved”, because 
dictum by L’Heureux-Dubé J. on that point “was not rejected by the Delisle 
majority”.75 In other words, the Court was at liberty to grant greater rights to 
agricultural workers employed privately than to federal government employees, 
because the majority opinion in Delisle had not expressly answered a dictum 
which appeared in a sole concurrence. Second, he emphasized that RCMP 
employees had been able to form organizations, despite their exclusion from 
the scheme, but agricultural workers had not. Though excluding the RCMP had 
little or no effect on the exercise of their freedom of association, the same was 
not true of Ontario’s agricultural workers.76 
Setting the circumstances of these workers aside for a moment, Dunmore is 
of transcending importance for its interpretation of section 2(d). In re-casting 
the Court’s conception of associational freedom, Bastarache J. denied that the 
Supreme Court had endorsed Professional Institute’s framework,77 and dis-
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  Dunmore, supra, note 59, at para. 21. 
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  Id., at para. 15. Specifically, he said that Professional Institute provided “little assistance 
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counted it as a test that “sheds light” but does not “capture the full range of 
activities protected by section 2(d)”.78 Thus freed from its constraints, he left no 
doubt that a collective dimension had been added to the scope of the guarantee. 
Invoking Dickson C.J.’s dissent in the Alberta Reference, which he also de-
scribed as not “explicitly rejected by the majority” on this point, Bastarache J. 
declared that the collective is qualitatively different: individuals associate “not 
simply because there is strength in numbers, but because communities can 
embody objectives that individuals cannot”.79 Accordingly, to limit section 2(d) 
to activities which can be performed by individuals would “render futile these 
fundamental initiatives”.80 In doctrinal terms, he reduced the guarantee to a 
single inquiry: has the state precluded activity because of its associational 
nature, thereby discouraging the collective pursuit of common goals?81 Without 
dismantling it, Bastarache J. displaced Professional Institute’s four-part test by 
changing the nature of the inquiry and focusing on whether the legislature 
targeted associational conduct because of its concerted or associational na-
ture.82  
Albeit reluctant to overrule the Labour Trilogy or the Professional Institute’s 
test, Bastarache J. was determined, nonetheless, to shift the Court’s conception 
of section 2(d) from its focus on the individual.83 On a close reading of key 
paragraphs there is no mistaking his support for an interpretation of associa-
tional freedom that extends to collective activities. For all practical purposes, 
Dunmore adopted then Dickson C.J.’s Labour Trilogy dissent. Though the 
decision left intact the doctrine linking section 2(d) to the rights of individuals, 
as noted earlier, the Charter’s guarantee of associational freedom was a dismal 
failure under that definition of the entitlement. By proposing a “single inquiry” 
to determine whether the state interfered with activity because it is collective in 
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nature, Dunmore injected vitality into a guarantee that was barely alive in the 
first 20 years of Charter interpretation.  
Redefining the scope of section 2(d) enabled the Court to find a breach in the 
circumstances. As noted above, Sharpe J. rejected the claim because nothing in 
the statute prohibited the agricultural workers from establishing, belonging to, 
or maintaining a labour union.84 Nor did the statute interfere with associational 
activities that were constitutionally protected or were otherwise lawful if per-
formed by an individual.85 Yet the appellants maintained that it was impossible 
for them to organize because of their exclusion from the statutory regime. In 
response to the claim, Bastarache J. framed the central question in these terms: 
can excluding agricultural workers from a statutory labour relations regime, 
without expressly or intentionally prohibiting association, constitute a “sub-
stantial interference” with freedom of association?86 Pursuant to his revitalized 
conception of the guarantee, Bastarache J. expanded section 2(d) to include 
“certain collective activities”, which, he maintained, must be recognized if the 
freedom to form and maintain an association is to have any meaning.87  
The next step in the analysis explained how the province violated the Charter 
by not legislating to protect the “meaningful exercise” of section 2(d)’s guaran-
tee.88 Not only did the trial judge attribute the workers’ problems to the private 
actions of their employers, there was little authority in the Charter jurispru-
dence for the imposition of positive obligations on the government. To trans-
form a question of private employment relations into a breach of the Charter, 
Bastarache J. transposed section 15’s concept of underinclusion to section 2(d). 
The statute’s exclusion of agricultural workers avoided the public/private di-
chotomy through the following reasoning. If underinclusion can state a claim 
under section 15(1), he suggested, it can also ground a breach of section 2 when 
the underinclusion results in “the denial of a fundamental freedom”.89 Put dif-
ferently, a claim that should be brought under section 15 is viable under section 
2 when the legislature’s inaction has adverse consequences for one of its fun-
damental freedoms. 
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This did not mean that the Charter would oblige the state to act in all cases. 
After noting that the Court should guard against reviewing legislative silence, 
Bastarache J. indicated that Dunmore’s circumstances were different. Thus he 
maintained that it is formalistic to consign the relationship between employer 
and employee to the private sphere when the government has regulated the 
relationship generally, though in a way that selectively excluded some workers. 
Should the Court impose a positive obligation on the state to protect private 
workers from their private employers, he stated, “that is only because such 
imposition is justified in the circumstances”.90  
That left unanswered the question whether the statutory exclusion had in fact 
substantially interfered with the section 2(d) rights of these workers. Even if the 
province failed to intervene, it was not self-evident that the government’s inac-
tion was the reason Ontario’s agricultural workers were without a union. Still, 
on the strength of their history, Bastarache J. found that there would be “no 
possibility for association as such without minimum statutory protection”.91 
Nor did he regard agricultural workers, who are marked by “their political 
impotence, their lack of resources to associate without state protection and their 
vulnerability to reprisal by their employers”, as comparable to the RCMP in 
Delisle.92 In the circumstances, he concluded that the workers’ plight was re-
inforced by legislation that failed to provide minimum protection and isolated 
agricultural workers from the general regime of labour relations.  
As a result, Ontario’s revival of the LRA did not “simply allow private cir-
cumstances to subsist; it re-inforced those circumstances by excluding agricul-
tural workers from the only available channel for associational activity”.93 By 
extending statutory protection to nearly every other class of worker, and selec-
tively excluding these workers, the LRA discredited their efforts and placed a 
chilling effect on their non-statutory union activity.94 On the question of breach, 
Bastarache J. found that the difficulties inherent in organizing farm workers, 
along with threats of economic reprisal from employers, could only partly 
explain why association was “all but impossible” in Ontario’s agricultural 
sector; equally important were the known and foreseeable effects of the legisla-
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tion which, in excluding agricultural workers, substantially interfered with their 
fundamental freedom to organize.95 
Having found that the legislation failed under section 1, in large part because 
its categorical exclusion of all agricultural workers failed minimal impairment, 
Bastarache J. addressed the level of statutory protection section 2(d) would 
require.96 Without committing the Court to a specific remedy, he stated that the 
principles outlined in the decision “require at a minimum a regime that pro-
vides agricultural workers with the protection necessary for them to exercise 
their constitutional freedom to form and maintain associations”.97 In further 
explanation, he indicated that section 2(d) also necessitated whatever protec-
tions are “judged essential” to the meaningful  
exercise of associational freedom, “such as freedom to assemble, to participate 
in the lawful activities of the association and to make representations, and the 
right to be free from interference, coercion and discrimination in the exercise of 
these freedoms”.98 
At face value, Dunmore stands for the novel proposition that the government 
has a constitutional obligation to protect private employees from private em-
ployers. As a matter of Charter interpretation, however, the Court’s reconceptu-
alization of section 2(d), some 15 years after the Labour Trilogy, is nothing less 
than a breakthrough. For escaping the constraints of the Labour Trilogy and 
Professional Institute, Bastarache J.’s opinion should be applauded.99 More-
over, it is evident that agricultural workers are disadvantaged, and that cate-
gorical exclusions, such as the LRA’s, should be difficult to justify. At the 
same time, it was next to impossible for the Court to find a breach of section 
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2(d) under existing authority: the jurisprudence and Delisle v. Canada, in par-
ticular, did not easily permit it, and nor did prevailing assumptions about the 
public/private distinction. And never before had the Court shown such eager-
ness to impose a positive obligation on government, especially in the field of 
labour relations. In fact, as Advance Cutting confirmed, less than two months 
earlier, deference was tantamount to an absolute rule in labour cases.100 
If the outcome in Dunmore appears driven by politics rather than principle, it 
also reveals how impoverished the Charter doctrine is, under section 15 as well 
as under section 2(d).101 A conventional analysis would have analyzed the 
statute’s exclusion of agricultural workers as a violation of equality. By being 
selectively excluded from the statutory scheme, these workers were not treated 
the same way and were unequal, relative to other workers. Unfortunately, the 
Court’s definition of equality is so encumbered by criteria and assumptions 
about human dignity it could not accommodate a claim that was a better fit 
under section 15 than under section 2(d). To avoid a result it considered unac-
ceptable, the Court had to alter the scope of associational freedom, deconstruct 
the public/private distinction, and support a conclusion that the statute, not the 
nature of the industry, was the cause of the workers’ inability to organize. 
Under a more constructive definition of equality, these distortions would have 
been unnecessary. 
It is too early to predict Dunmore’s impact. Attempts to apply its principle of 
collective endeavour to other contexts could be met with the answer that Dun-
more was a labour relations case or, more precisely, a labour relations case 
particular to the circumstances of agricultural workers. At the same time, there 
is little in Bastarache J.’s discussion of section 2(d) to suggest that his concep-
tion of collective activity was specific to the circumstances of the case. Like-
wise, he was also able to dismiss concerns about the public/private distinction 
and the authority of Dolphin Delivery by declaring that the Court’s understand-
ing of state action had “matured” since that decision, and might mature “further 
in light of evolving Charter values”.102 If Advance Cutting presaged Dunmore 
in a certain way, these comments about Dolphin Delivery’s declining stature 
could hardly have provided a more explicit cue to the third decision in the 
trilogy. 
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IV. R.W.D.S.U. V. PEPSI–COLA CANADA BEVERAGES (WEST)103 
As noted, Dunmore held that the relationship between farmers and their em-
ployees was not private. In a decision that directly implicated Dolphin Delivery, 
Pepsi-Cola extended the constitutionalization of private relations in a common 
law context. One of the Supreme Court’s early landmarks, Dolphin Delivery 
held that the Charter does not apply to common law actions between private 
parties, and that section 2(b) would not protect labour unions in proceedings 
brought to enjoin secondary picketing.104 There, McIntyre J.’s dicta was clear 
that picketing, which is included in section 2(b)’s guarantee of expressive 
freedom, could justifiably be limited under section 1. Undeterred by precedent, 
Pepsi-Cola held, to the contrary, that the common law must be modified to 
accommodate the Charter’s protection of picketing, whether primary or secon-
dary. 
In the first 20 years, it was difficult to predict whether and when the Court 
would defer to the legislature or enforce the Charter; whether and when the 
common law would be modified to reflect Charter values was little different. 
On that question, the Court has both declined the opportunity, claiming that it is 
the legislature’s prerogative to change the law, and taken the initiative, on 
grounds that the common law is judge-made and that it is the court’s responsi-
bility to ensure that its evolution is compatible with the Charter. R. v. Salituro 
spoke to the ambivalence of this dynamic in stating that “[j]udges can and 
should adapt the common law to reflect the changing social, moral and eco-
nomic fabric of the country”, and adding the qualification that there are “sig-
nificant constraints on the power of the judiciary to change the law”.105  
In Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, for example, the Court refused 
to modify the law of defamation to accommodate the constitutional status of 
expressive freedom.106 As Cory J. explained, the judiciary has “traditionally 
been cautious regarding the extent to which they will amend the common law”, 
and that “[f]ar-reaching changes to the common law must be left to the legisla-
ture”.107 In Pepsi-Cola, however, the joint opinion of McLachlin C.J. and LeBel 
J. declared that statutory silence should not be interpreted as a legislative intent 
to crystallize the common law. In their view, when the legislature chose not to 
address or alter the common law of secondary picketing, the lawmakers “must 
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be taken” to have understood that the common law is subject to change at the 
hands of the judiciary.108 
Prior to Pepsi-Cola, Charter values had not been applied in litigation be-
tween purely private parties.109 The two precedents closest on point were Dol-
phin Delivery and Hill v. Church of Scientology, and though the Charter claim 
failed each time, Pepsi-Cola relied on both. First the joint opinion invoked 
Dolphin Delivery and McIntyre J.’s much-studied remark that, even when it 
does not apply, the Charter is “far from irrelevant to private litigants whose 
disputes fall to be decided at common law”.110 There, in dictum, he suggested 
that the judiciary ought to develop and apply the principles of the common law 
in a manner consistent with the fundamental values of the Constitution.111 
Without repeating Dunmore’s observation that the Court’s understanding of 
Dolphin Delivery had matured, the joint opinion in Pepsi-Cola added that the 
common law “does not grow in isolation from the Charter, but rather with it”.112 
Accordingly, the judges found that the common law reflects Charter values, 
that freedom of expression is one such value, and that the common law must be 
modified to accommodate section 2(b)’s interest in protecting secondary labour 
picketing. 
Second, in explaining its Charter values methodology, the joint opinion in 
Pepsi-Cola referred to Scientology, which balanced expressive freedom against 
reputation, and found that the Charter value at stake was not strong enough to 
demand modifications to the law of defamation. Though Pepsi-Cola described 
Scientology’s as a “flexible balancing” approach, the purpose of flexibility in 
that case was to make it difficult for one private party to invoke the Charter in a 
contest against another private party.113 In fact, the decision expressly cautioned 
against importing into private litigation the analysis which applies in cases 
involving government action.114 Accordingly, Cory J. declared that a section 1 
analysis was unnecessary in settings which posed a conflict between principles; 
in such circumstances, it was sufficient for the Court to weigh Charter values, 
framed in general terms, against the underlying principles of the common 
law.115 
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88  Supreme Court Law Review (2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
On the merits Cory J. attributed significant value to the protection of reputa-
tion and then found, in comparison, that defamatory statements are “very tenu-
ously connected to the core values which underlie section 2(b)”.116 In the 
circumstances, expressive freedom did not stand a chance in the balancing of 
values, and though Scientology and Pepsi-Cola both concerned private rela-
tions, the Charter modified the common law in one but not the other. The dif-
ference between the two was that secondary labour picketing is high value 
expression and defamatory statements are not. 
Though it worked in favour of expressive freedom, Pepsi-Cola reverted to a 
methodology that rests on a subjective assessment of the value of expression. 
Pursuant to that approach, the joint opinion declared that picketing, and espe-
cially labour picketing, engages the “highest constitutional values”.117 In the 
view of the judges, expression on working conditions “contributes to self-
understanding as well as to the ability to influence one’s working and non-
working life”.118 Moreover, as the presumptive imbalance between the em-
ployer’s power and the worker’s vulnerability informs “virtually all aspects of 
the employment relationship”, free expression plays a “significant role in re-
dressing or alleviating this imbalance”.119 Last but not least, by bringing debate 
on labour conditions into the public realm, this expressive activity benefits 
society as a whole.120  
The specific issue at stake in Pepsi-Cola was whether secondary picketing is 
illegal per se at common law. Any such principle would be difficult to sustain 
under a conventional section 1 analysis, as the minimal impairment element of 
proportionality looks askance at blanket prohibitions and categorical rules. 
According to Scientology, though, common law rules do not have to be justified 
under section 1. Though it claimed to follow that approach, the joint opinion 
blurred two Charter methodologies that Scientology indicated should be kept 
separate.121 
A further complication was KMart which, only a few year earlier, had ex-
tended constitutional status to secondary labour leafleting, by arguing that 
appeals to persuasion and should not be equated with picketing, which is coer-
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cive and can therefore be regulated.122 Though KMart did not purport to address 
the status of secondary picketing at common law, the Court was explicit in that 
case that picketing and leafleting have “fundamentally different effects”. More 
specifically, Cory J. declared that “[w]hile the former uses coercion and obedi-
ence to a picket line to impede public access to an enterprise”, the latter “at-
tempts to rationally persuade consumers to take their business elsewhere”.123 
Though the viability of that distinction is questionable, it was adopted by all 
members of the panel in KMart and therefore invited a response in Pepsi-Cola. 
KMart emphasized the “signalling effect” of a picket line, which acts as a 
barrier and coerces individuals not to cross. Without overruling KMart’s analy-
sis, the joint opinion indicated that the signalling effect should be “carefully 
assessed”.124 The Chief Justice and LeBel J. pointed out that picketing may 
have a coercive signal effect, but that does not mean the activity is not expres-
sion and worthy of protection.125 Rather than state a special rule for picketing, 
the courts should acknowledge its status as expression and determine the per-
missibility of limits on a case-to-case basis. In reply to Cory J.’s KMart distinc-
tion between coercion and an appeal to persuasion, the judges added that 
section 2(b)’s protection is not contingent on rationality, either on the part of 
the speaker or the listener.126 The judges thought that to proceed otherwise 
would suggest that labour expression is “fundamentally less important” than 
expression in other contexts.127 In any case, they noted, it is a mistake to con-
clude that picketing’s coercive effect is effective, or that picketing is coercive 
rather than persuasive in all cases.128 
The joint opinion expressed the concern that a common law rule designating 
secondary picketing as illegal would constitute a “special rule for unions”.129 
By way of rectification, Pepsi-Cola declared that all picketing is allowed, 
                                                                                                                                                              
122
  [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083. 
123
  Id., at 1116. 
124
  Pepsi-Cola, 2002 SCC 8, at para. 95. 
125
  Id., at para. 96 (stating that it is difficult to see “how a signal can be other than expres-
sive”, and that the underlying concern of KMart is that “the signal will express too much, that it 
will be too effective”). 
126
  Id., at para. 97 (stating that irrationality may result in particular kinds of speech being ac-
corded less protection, without justifying the denial of all protection). 
127
  Id., at paras. 96 and 97; see also para. 80 (indicating concern that an independent tort of 
secondary picketing applies only in a labour context and creates a distinction between labour and 
other picketing that is difficult to justify). 
128
  Id., at paras. 95 and 98. 
129
  Id., at para. 97. 
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whether primary or secondary, unless it involves tortious or criminal conduct.130 
Though there might be anomalies, the joint opinion stated that “it is safe to 
assert that a wrongful action-based approach will catch most problematic pick-
eting” and that the law of tort can be expected “to develop in accordance with 
Charter values”.131 For all intents and purposes, Pepsi-Cola constitutionalized 
the common law pertaining to labour disputes, and effectively overruled Dol-
phin Delivery. Though the Court argued that Dolphin Delivery left the issue of 
secondary picketing open, McIntyre J. was clear that private relations are not 
subject to the Charter.132 Through Pepsi-Cola’s application of a values analysis, 
the Charter became as binding on private parties as it would have been on 
legislation enacted by the government.  
As the crucial aspect of the decision, Pepsi-Cola’s constitutionalization of 
the common law between private litigants will attract comment and encourage 
new claims. Rather than engage that issue, this paper draws attention to related 
anomalies which are created by the Court’s decision to constitutionalize rela-
tions between a union and a third party stranger to a labour dispute. From a 
methodological perspective, the difference between the Court’s Charter values 
analysis in Church of Scientology and in Pepsi-Cola is significant. In Scientol-
ogy, Cory J. declared that changes to the common law should be made by the 
legislature, that the rules that apply in cases involving government should not 
be imported into private litigation, that dual burdens should be imposed on 
those invoking the Charter against other private parties, and that common law 
limits on Charter values do not require formal justification. 
By contrast, Pepsi-Cola began from a different set of assumptions. The joint 
opinion emphasized that “free speech is near the top of the values that Canadi-
ans hold dear”, and indicated more than once that expressive activity is particu-
larly valuable in the area of labour relations.133 Not only was labour expression 
valuable to its speakers, in stirring public debate the Court found that it had 
wider value. To back-track yet again, the litigation in Scientology arose after 
the Church decided to publicize its concerns about a Crown attorney who exer-
cised significant powers in relation to the criminal process. Given the plaintiff’s 
position as an officer of the Crown and the courts, it is arguable that the private 
litigation there had a more compelling public dimension than Pepsi-Cola’s 
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strike between a private employer and its employees. 134 The statements by the 
Church were malicious and the plaintiff would have succeeded under almost 
any standard that modified the balance between reputation and expressive 
freedom. Yet the Court failed to grasp that, defamatory though they were, the 
Church’s statements spoke to the accountability of public servants. 
Because the content of secondary picketing was deemed important, the Court 
found that the “starting point” must be freedom of expression, and that limita-
tions are permitted but “only to the extent” that is justified under section 1.135 In 
this there is little resemblance between the approach followed in Scientology. 
As Pepsi-Cola indicated, “[t]he preferred methodology is to begin with the 
proposition that secondary picketing is prima facie legal, and then impose such 
limitations as may be justified in the interests of protecting third parties”.136 
On the question of limits and the harm secondary picketing would inflict on 
neutral third parties, it is instructive to compare the Court’s approach to harm in 
other contexts. As R. v. Keegstra, R. v. Butler and other decisions confirm, 
section 1 does not require proof of concrete or particular harm.137 It was suffi-
cient, in the past, that the expressive activity offended subjective perceptions or 
principles of equality. Moreover, Scientology upheld an unprecedented award 
of damages for harm to reputation, in circumstances where the evidence of any 
impact on the individual’s standing in the community was weak, if not non-
existent. By assuming that valueless expression must also be harmful, the Court 
equated value and harm in these cases. 
Most recently, Pepsi-Cola’s joint opinion reasoned that if primary picketing 
can permissibly have a harmful impact on third parties and the public, there is 
little reason to treat secondary picketing differently.138 In this, the joint opinion 
glossed the distinction between the harm neutrals might indirectly suffer as the 
result of successful primary picketing, and secondary picketing’s direct inflic-
tion of harm on parties who, as strangers to the dispute, have little power or 
influence to affect its resolution.139 In Dolphin Delivery, for example, McIntyre 
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J. stated that secondary picketing differs “because the third party is not con-
cerned in the dispute” and “the basis of our system of collective bargaining is 
that the parties themselves should, whenever possible, work out their own 
agreement.140 To that he added “[i]t is reasonable to restrain picketing so that 
the conflict will not escalate beyond the actual parties”.141 Moreover, in contrast 
to the cases above, which imposed limits on expressive activity linked to non-
particularized psychological and perceptive harm, Pepsi-Cola accepted that 
economic harm can be directly inflicted on third parties.142 Though the Court 
acknowledged the permissibility of limits by its “wrongful action” exception to 
picketing, the point is that its perception of harm varies from case to case, 
depending on its approval or disapproval of the expressive activity in question. 
In its section 2(b) jurisprudence last year, there were indications that a ma-
jority of the Court might be prepared to step away from a “values methodol-
ogy”.143 Insofar as a “values analysis” is undertaken, in circumstances when the 
Charter does not formally apply, Pepsi-Cola demonstrates that the Court re-
mains willing to base the level of constitutional protection it assigns an activity 
on its value as expression. The question Pepsi-Cola raises is whether the com-
mon law in other litigation between private parties will also be constitutional-
ized, and whether the infliction of harm will be considered valuable in other 
contexts, as it was here. If the answers to those questions are no, then Pepsi-
Cola will have exchanged the common law’s special rule for another special 
rule for unions under the Charter.  
V.  A FINAL RECKONING 
It cannot be a coincidence, especially given labour’s bleak prospects in the 
first 20 years of Charter interpretation, that unions emerged as winners in the 
“second labour trilogy”. Yet as suggested above, the result could easily have 
gone the other way in any or all of these cases. Though the close vote in Ad-
vance Cutting speaks for itself, siding with the workers in Dunmore required 
the Court to reverse the lower court decisions and revisit the facts as well as the 
law. As for the third decision, though a per se rule about secondary labour 
picketing would ordinarily be vulnerable under the Charter if contained in 
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legislation, the Court could not modify the common law in Pepsi-Cola without 
turning its back on Dolphin Delivery and explaining away KMart’s vital dis-
tinction between conventional picketing and leafleting. 
At the least then, these decisions suggest the following. Advance Cutting’s 
retreat from the Rand formula implies that when a choice must be made be-
tween collective and individual interests, the collective can be expected to 
prevail. Next under Dunmore, the government can be held responsible for not 
guaranteeing the meaningful exercise of associational freedom by private sector 
employees. Finally, in the wake of Dunmore’s conclusion that the government 
has a duty to intervene in private relations, Pepsi-Cola undermined Dolphin 
Delivery’s assumption that the public and private must remain separate, lest the 
Charter smother the common law. Once having discounted that concern 
through a values analysis, Pepsi-Cola dismissed Dolphin Delivery’s dictum that 
the common law principles which limit secondary labour picketing are justified. 
By reaching in every way the second trilogy shows how far the Court was 
prepared to go in securing the rights of workers. 
Though the trilogy’s consequences for labour relations and the Charter re-
main unknown at present, a further question is whether its principles will trans-
late to other issues. If the private became public in Dunmore, and the Charter 
modified the common law in Pepsi-Cola, it is dubious that other private rela-
tions or fixtures of the common law will now be subject to review as a matter 
of reflex. In this, it should be noted that Dunmore is replete with qualifications: 
underinclusion should be addressed under section 15; the Court should guard 
against reviewing legislative silence; other decisions which refused to impose a 
positive obligation were different; and the plight of Dunmore’s workers was 
explained by their particular history. The Court can also minimize Pepsi-Cola’s 
impact on the common law in private litigation by reviving the principle from 
Scientology, that the initiative for change belongs to the legislature, or invoking 
Scientology’s other rationale, that the activity in issue is not valuable enough to 
displace common law principle. The Court’s eagerness to distinguish the trilogy 
decisions in future cases will either confirm or undercut the impression that the 
trilogy established special rules for unions. 
Another indication that the trilogy’s principles might not translate to other 
contexts can be found in Suresh v. Canada.144 There, a Convention refugee 
faced refoulment to his mother country, in circumstances which placed him at 
risk of being tortured upon his return. He challenged the constitutionality of the 
grounds for deportation, as well as the deportation order itself. Essentially, 
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section 19 of the Immigration Act provides that a refugee can be deported when 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that person is a member of an organiza-
tion that there are reasonable grounds to believe has engaged in terrorism, 
either in the past or at present.145 While the Court found that a deportee could 
not generally be deported to face a substantial risk of torture, and specified the 
procedures that are required by section 7 before an order can be made, it ne-
glected to address the constitutionality of section 19.  
Once the Court concluded that the deportation order could not stand, it be-
came unnecessary to deal with section 19. Still, its willingness to overlook 
provisions which, on the face of it, represent a serious interference with expres-
sive and associational freedom, is disturbing. This is especially troubling be-
cause the activity which prompted the deportation order was fund-raising, 
which is not only constitutionally protected but also, in appellant’s case, was 
remote in time and place from the commission of any terrorist acts.146 Yet the 
Court showed no interest in the legislation’s implications for section 2(b) and 
(d), including its unavoidable chilling effects on refugee and immigrant popula-
tions.147 Whereas the deportation order was specific to Suresh, section 19, 
which might inhibit any number of individuals from exercising their constitu-
tional rights, stayed in place. 
As noted above, the majority and concurring opinions in Dunmore found that 
legislative inaction placed an impermissible chill on the organizational activi-
ties of Ontario’s agricultural workers. This is an unusual interpretation of a 
doctrine whose underlying principle is that over-reaching by the legislature 
might catch constitutionally protected activity as well as activity that can justi-
fiably be limited. The essence of the doctrine is the inhibiting and self-
censoring impact of government regulation that sweeps too broadly and thereby 
“chills” legitimate activity.148 In Dunmore, neither Bastarache J. nor 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. cited authority for the proposition that the state can chill the 
exercise of constitutional rights by doing nothing at all; in fact, L’Heureux-
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Dubé J. stated that the concept is premised on the idea that individuals antici-
pating penalties might hesitate before exercising their rights.149 Assuming that 
chilling effects can be sustained through government action or inaction, the 
quirky use of the concept in Dunmore, when set against Suresh, which pre-
sented a classic example, reinforces the impression that the Court established 
special rules for unions in these cases. 
The decision whether to enforce a guarantee or acquiesce in the status quo, 
whether under statute or common law, will depend on the Court’s perception of 
what justice requires in the circumstances. Disagreement as to the meaning and 
demands of justice is inevitable, as is the tension between a result-oriented 
jurisprudence and one that values principle. If the justness of principle can 
provoke almost as much disagreement as debate about a just or unjust result, at 
the least, principle provides a standard by which results can be compared from 
case to case. How successfully the Court demonstrates its commitment to prin-
ciple should be the true test of its jurisprudence. 
Looking at the second trilogy from that perspective, it is difficult to conclude 
that principle was consistently applied in these cases. For instance, Advance 
Cutting and Dunmore cannot be easily reconciled, for those who comprised the 
majority in Advance Cutting abandoned their fealty to deference in labour 
relations and accepted a lenient standard of proof on the question of breach in 
Dunmore. The appellants’ claim was against the weight of authority, and there 
was no other way for the workers to win in that case. 
The extension of the Charter to private relations is another key feature of 
these decisions. Once under a statutory regime, in Dunmore, and then again, 
under the common law in Pepsi-Cola, the Court discounted two well-
established assumptions of Charter interpretation. First, in imposing a positive 
constitutional obligation on the government to protect one party from another in 
private relations, Dunmore ventured some distance from the boundaries marked 
by the Court’s previous Charter jurisprudence. Then the principle that the Char-
ter does not apply to common law litigation between private parties vanished in 
Pepsi-Cola. The Court achieved this feat through a values analysis, which plays 
a role when the Charter does not apply. The artifice was pressed into service to 
avoid open contradiction between Pepsi-Cola and Dolphin Delivery, which was 
directly on point. Still, the result was the same, in substantive terms, as it would 
have been had the Court overruled Dolphin Delivery and formally applied the 
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Charter. Once again, workers would not have won in Dunmore or Pepsi-Cola 
under the existing jurisprudence. 
Time will tell whether the second trilogy should be understood as a series of 
decisions favourable to workers, or otherwise result in applications to other 
Charter claims. 
A final point arises from Dunmore and its brief consideration of the choice 
between sections 2(d) and 15. As noted earlier, it would have made better 
analytical sense to place the statute’s defect of underinclusion under section 
15’s jurisdiction. In light of doctrine, the claim could not easily succeed under 
either guarantee, and so the Court chose to alter its definition of associational 
freedom. How that might affect the relationship between sections 2(d) and 1 did 
not enter the discussion, for the likely reason that it was not considered rele-
vant. 
Lavoie v. Canada (Public Service Commission), the most recent equality de-
cision, is mentioned here because it shows, after many years and the arrival of 
the Law test, that the Court remains as transfixed as ever by the relationship 
between section 15 and section 1.150 The question for answer in Lavoie was 
whether a citizen’s preference in access to federal public service employment 
violated the equality rights of non-citizens and, if so, whether the limit was 
justifiable under section 1. Though the Court upheld the preference by a vote of 
6 to 3, Arbour J. challenged Bastarache J.’s section 15 analysis.151 At this stage 
of an article on the rights of workers, there is not time or space to launch an 
analysis of their disagreement, and little percentage taking sides between the 
two. Rather, the idea is to offer a few modest observations. 
The starting point is that, in truth, section 15 has largely been an exercise in 
frustration. Albeit with exceptions, disagreement among members of the Court 
may be the defining characteristic of the equality jurisprudence. The Supreme 
Court of Canada’s indecision as to the scope of the guarantee was, for years 
following its initial interpretation in Andrews v. Law Society of British Colum-
bia, a source of uncertainty and irritation.152 Then it seemed possible to imagine 
a new era when all members of the Court endorsed Iacobucci J.’s framework 
for section 15 analysis in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immi-
gration).153 If agreement on a standard marked a step forward, unfortunately it 
came in the form of a methodology that is abstract and unwieldy.  
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Without recounting the details, the disagreement between Bastarache J. and 
Arbour J. in Lavoie centred on the “human dignity” test and, in particular, the 
relative importance of subjective and objective perceptions of what offends an 
individual’s dignity under section 15.154 As the exchange between the judges 
demonstrates, Law can support a generous interpretation of the guarantee and 
just as easily lead to internal limits on the right. As a result, both could claim 
that their analysis in Lavoie was faithful to the Law methodology.155 The differ-
ence between the two approaches is that a more generous interpretation concep-
tualizes the relationship between the right and its limits under section 1 a 
different way than its alternative, which would restrict the scope of the guaran-
tee. 
For that reason, the debate on this point between Bastarache J. and Arbour J. 
should be understood as an important one. Far from providing a reliable struc-
ture for section 15 analysis, the human dignity branch of the Law test has fur-
ther obfuscated the meaning of equality under the Charter. And, as Arbour J.’s 
reasons in Lavoie demonstrate, the third inquiry can easily become the off-site 
location of a section 1 analysis.156 In the absence of content, it provides a 
mechanism for the Court to expand or contract section 15 at will, on a case to 
case basis. 
The main point here is that Law failed to resolve the Court’s fundamental 
ambivalence toward section 15. As a result, the real question whether the 
analysis should be concentrated on section 15 or more readily shunted to sec-
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treatment offends human dignity, according to a battery of criteria which includes the way it is 
subjectively and objectively perceived; Lavoie, supra, note 150, at para. 38 (setting out the Law 
test). 
155
  For instance, Bastarache J. defended his conclusion that s. 15 had been breached, stating 
“[i]t is the very structure of the Charter that mandates [a distinction between the right and its 
limits], as well as the methodology adopted by the Court since Andrews”; Lavoie, supra, note 150, 
at para. 49. Meantime, in holding that s. 15 was not infringed, Arbour J. claimed that “the broader 
reach given to s. 15 the more likely it is that it will be deprived of any real content”, id. at para. 84; 
that the third branch of the Law test should be allowed “to do the kind of sorting it was intended to 
do”, id., at para. 87, and that a lack of rigour in application would result in “irrevocable damage to 
the Law methodology”, id., at para. 81. 
156
  Arbour J. argued that Bastarache J. had so privileged the subjective element of the test as 
to strip equality rights of any meaningful content. In her view, this approach compromised the Law 
test and undercut the function of s. 1. She supported an objective test that would respect the need 
for internal limits. Looking at Law’s objective criterion, the problem is that asking whether a 
reasonable person, similarly situated, would understand the distinction as an affront to human 
dignity is shorthand for the question whether the inequality is justifiable. In this, Arbour J.’s 
analysis shows the degree to which her approach would conduct a s. 1 analysis in s. 15. If a reason-
able person would not be affronted by the consequences for her human dignity then s. 15 is not 
breached, but what is reasonable is also inherently justifiable. 
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tion 1 will be diverted, and in its place there will be more of the skirmishes over 
subjective and objective perceptions of dignity that erupted in Lavoie. Yet the 
answer to this quandary will not be found in any fresh insights into the condi-
tion of human dignity; instead, it is contingent on the Court’s intellectual and 
institutional determination to settle the relationship between sections 15 and 1. 
This question has nagged the Court from the outset, and it continues to trou-
ble the Court today. In that regard, it is worth remembering that section 15 will 
not celebrate its 20th anniversary until 2005. This year’s second labour trilogy 
proves that the Court is capable of shifting directions and rethinking the as-
sumptions of the early jurisprudence. If the McLachlin Court can revisit the 
Labour Trilogy’s definition of associational freedom, there is no reason it can-
not also reconsider its approach to section 15. 
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